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v. IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
On Children and Dual Nationality: 
Sabet and The Islamic Republic ofIran 
Nancy Amoury Combs' 
Keywords: dual nationality, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, minors, 
Abstract: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's recent decision in Sabet and The Islamic 
Republic of Iran sheds new light on difficult issues concerning the dual nationality of minors. 
In particular, the case was the first in which the Tribunal determined minor dual national 
claimants to have a dominant and effective nationality different from that of either of their 
parents. Further, the Tribunal broke new ground in its analysis of 'the caveat,' an equitable 
doctrine that can bar the claims of dual nationals. This article applauds the Tribunal's ad-
vances in its caveat jurisprudence and develops a new approach that would further those ad-
vances. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Sabet family was among the wealthiest 
in Iran.! The patriarch of the family, Habib Sabet, was born to poverty but went 
on to establish. either alone or with joint venture partners, numerous Iranian 
companies in a wide array of fields.' By the time of the Revolution, the Sabets 
owned. among many other things, one of Iran's largest soft-drink bottling enter-
prises, which held the exclusive Pepsi-Cola franchise; one of Iran's largest retail 
and wholesale distributors for pharmaceutical products. household appliances, 
and various commodities; and a real estate company that held nearly one hun-
dred properties, including a replica of Versailles' Petit Trianon. Altogether, they 
had substantial interests in more than twenty companies, including Iran's 
Volkswagen distributorship, Iran's General Tire distributorship, and several 
banks. Also by the time of the Revolution. Habib's two sons, Iradj and Hormoz, 
, 
1. 
2. 
Legal Adviser, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands. J.D., University of 
California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I am grateful for the helpful comments of Judge George H. Al-
drich, Bruce Combs, Thomas Ginsburg, and Sam Hirsch. The opinions expressed and any errors are 
those of the author. 
See Aram Sabet and The Islamic Republic of Iran. Award No. 593-815/816/817-2, 30 June 1999, at 
para. 7 [hereinafter Sabet]. 
Habib Sabet is Dead: An Iranian Altruist and Industrialist, 86, N.Y. Times, 24 February 1990. See 
also Pepsi, TV Magnate Sabetdies in L.A., Iran Times, 2 March 1990. 
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were largely managing the Sabet empire, and each of those two sons had three 
children.3 
In the Spring of 1979, the newly established Islamic Republic ofiran expro-
priated all of the Sabets' Iranian assets.4 Almost two years later, in January 
1981, Iran and the United States adhered to the Algiers Declarations; a treaty 
which secured the release of the American hostages who had been held in Iran 
for the previous fourteen months and which created the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal to arbitrate the many claims of United States nationals against 
Iran.6 The Algiers Declarations provided no hope of recovery for most members 
of the Sabet family because neither Habib, nor his wife Bahereh, nor their sons, 
Iradj and Hormoz, nor Iradj's three children had any claim to being a United 
States national. However, Hormoz's three children, Reja, Aram, and Karim, 
were born in the United States and thus were United States nationals under 
United States law. Consequently, Reja, Aram, and Karim Sabet - who were 
fourteen, eight, and three years old, respectively, at the time of the expropriation 
- filed claims with the Tribunal seeking nearly $75 million plus interest and 
costs for their expropriated shares in the Sabet companies. 
After holding the longest hearing in the Tribunal's history, Chamber Two of 
the Tribunal issued its Award in Sabel and The Islamic Republic of Iran on 30 
June 1999.7 The Tribunal's treatment of the Sabet children's claims sheds new 
light on issues concerning the dual nationality of minors and beneficial owner-
ship, and the Tribunal broke new ground in its analysis of "the caveat," an equi-
table doctrine that can bar the claims of dual nationals. 
To resolve the Sabet children's claims, the Tribunal had to decide four ques-
tions: (I) whether the Sabet children were "United States nationals" for purposes 
of the Algiers Declarations such that the Tribunal would have jurisdiction over 
their claims; (2) whether the children in fact owned the shares that they claimed 
to own; (3) whether Iran expropriated those shares; and finally (4) whether the 
3. See Sabel, supra note 1, para. 7. 
4. ld., para. 103. 
5. The term 'Algiers Declarations' refers to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria ("General Declaration"), 19 January 1981, reprinted in llran·US CTR 
3, and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria COD-
cerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Claims Settlement Declaration" or "CSD"), 19 January 
1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 9. 
6. The Tribunal also has jurisdiction over the claims of Iranian nationals against the United States, 
CSD, supra note 5, Art. II, para. 1, over claims of Iran and the United States "against each other 
arising out of contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale of goods and serv-
ices," Id., Art. II, para. 2, and over disputes concerning the interpretation ofthe General Declaration, 
Id., at Art. II, para. 3, and the Claims Settlement Declaration, id,. Art. VI, para. 4. 
7. See Sabet supra note I; Tribunal Says Iran Liable for Expropriation of Sabet Grandchildren's Own-
ership Interests in 6 Companies, 14 No.8 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. 19 (1999). 
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Tribunal's caveat doctrine applied to the claims: After discussing each issue in 
turn, I will propose a new approach to the Tribunal's caveat analysis. 
2. JURISDICTION - DOMINANT AND EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY 
Although tbe Sabet children were unquestionably United States nationals under 
the United States law by virtue of their birth in the United States, they were also 
unquestionably Iranian nationals under Iranian law by virtue of their birth to an 
Iranian father.9 The Claims Settlement Declaration (the document establishing 
the Tribunal) gives the Tribunal jurisdiction, inter alia, over "claims of nationals 
of the United States against Iran,"lO but it provides no specific guidance as to 
whether the phrase "nationals of the United States" includes dual United States-
Iranian nationals like the Sabet children - that is, persons who are United States 
nationals under United States law and Iranian nationals under Iranian law. lI 
The Tribunal decided that very controversial question in 1984 when, in Case 
No. AI8,!2 it adopted the "dominant and effective nationality" standard;!] the 
Tribunal held that it "has jurisdiction over claims against Iran by dual Iran-
United States nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the 
claimant during the relevant period from the date the claim arose until 19 Janu-
ary 1981 [(the date ofthe Algiers Declarations)] was that of the United States."!4 
So, in keeping with Case No. A18, the Tribunal's first question in Sabel was 
whether the Sabet children were dominant and effective United States nationals 
between II April 1979, the date the earliest of their claims arose, and 19 January 
1981. 
8. The Tribunal also had to determine whether the Sabet children assigned their claims to a New York-
based Sabet company, which would have deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction over the claims. See 
Sabel, supra note I, para. 51 (determining that Iran did not prove an assignment of claims). 
9. Id., para. 32. 
10. CSD, supra note 5, Art. II, para. I, reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 9. 
11. The Claims Settlement Declaration defines a "'national' of [ ... ] the United States" as, inter alia, "a 
natural person who is a citizen of [ ... ] the United States." Id., at Art. VII, para. 1, reprinted in 1 
Iran-US CTR 11, but this definition does not conclusively answer the question. See Case No. A18, 
Decision No. DEC 32-AI8-FT, 6 April 1984, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR251, 259-60. 
12. Case No. A18, Decision No. DEC 32-AI8-FT, 6 April 1984, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 251 
[hereinafter Case No. Al 8]. 
13. In doing so, the Tribunal relied heavily on the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 2nd 
Phase, Judgment of6 April 1955, 1955lCJ Rep. 4, and on the Merge case (US v. Itruy), 14 RIAA 
235 (1955), decided by the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission. 
14. Case No. A18, supra note 12, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 265. For discussions of that decision, see 
P.E. Mahoney, Comment, The Standing of Dual Nationals Before the Iran-United States Claims Tri-
bunal, 24 Va. 1. Int'! L 695 (1984); Note, Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era: The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, 83 Mich. L Rev. 597 (1984); see also R. Khan, The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal: Controversies, Cases and Contribution 120-153 (1990) (discussing Case No. 
A18's precursor, Nasser Esphahanian and Bank Tejarat Award No. 31-157-2, 29 March 1983, re-
printed in 2 Iran-US CTR 157). 
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In determining a claimant's dominant and effective nationality, the Tribunal 
considers a variety of factors, including "habitual residence, center of interests, 
family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of attacbrnent."15 Be-
cause the Tribunal has determined the dominant and effective nationality of 
dozens of dual-national claimants, it has developed a substantial body of case 
law which has been the subject of much commentary.16 What makes Sabet's ap-
plication of that case law interesting is that the Sabet Claimants were children 
during the relevant period. 
The Tribunal tries to consider the dominant and effective nationality of mi-
nor" claimants separately from that of their parents,18 but in some cases this has 
proved a difficult task. As the Tribunal frankly acknowledged in Sabet, the fac-
tors that the Tribunal relies upon to determine a claimant's dominant and effec-
tive nationality are more relevant to determining an adult's nationality than that 
of a child. 19 Although a minor claimant, no less than an adult, can have a habit-
ual residence, a center of interests, and family ties, he is likely to have had no 
independent choice as to those aspects of his life and may be unable to engage in 
the kind of pursuits that demonstrate allegiance to a nation.20 
For this reason, perhaps, even though the Tribunal does consider the domi-
nant and effective nationality of minor claimants separately from that of their 
parents, it has never found a minor claimant to be a dominant and effective 
United States national when it has determined in the same case that the minor's 
parent was a dominant and effective Iranian national. In Anita Perry-Rohani and 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,21 for instance, the Tribunal 
considered the claims of an American-born mother and her two small children. 
The family arrived in the United States in January 1979, and their claims arose 
seven months later, when the children were four-and-a-half years old and 22 
months old." After finding the American-born mother to be a dominant and ef-
15. Case No. AlB, supra note 12, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 265. For a discussion of the Tribunal's 
consideration of 'habitual residence' rather than domicile, see D. 1. 8edennan, Eligible Claimants 
Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in R.B. Lillich & D.B. Magraw (Eds.), The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility 71-73 (1998). 
16. See, e.g., G.H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribuna159-76 (1996); 
Bederman, supra note 15, at 65-81; 0.1. Bederrnan, Nationality of Individual Claimants Before the 
lran~United States Claims Tribunal, 42 lnt'! & Compo L.Q. 119 (1993). 
17. I use "minor" to mean a person under 18 years of age. 
18. See Ardavan Peter Samrad and The Government of the Islamic Republic ofIran, Award No. 505-
46114621463/464/465-2,4 February 1991, para. 37, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 44,56 [hereinafter 
Samrad}. 
19. Sabel, supra note 1, para. 33. The Tribunal noted, for instance, that in the Nottebohm case, the Inter-
national Court of Justice included among the relevant factors in assessing an individual's dominant 
and effective nationality, the '''attachment shown by [the individual] for a given country and incul-
cated in his children. '" Id., para. 33, n.S. 
20. See iel,. para. 33 ("A minor does not possess the level of maturity necessary to detennine where he 
or she wishes to live, let alone to show allegiance to a particular nation."). 
21. Award No. 427-831-3 (30 Jun. 1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-US CTR 194 [hereinafter Perry-Rohani]' 
22. Id,. paras. 9, 18, reprinted in 22 Iran-US CTR 196,199. 
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fective Iranian national, the Tribunal reached the same conclusion as to her chil-
dren.23 The Tribunal noted that at the time the 22-month-old child's claims 
arose, he "was still an infant, totally dependent on his mother."24 As for the older 
child, the Tribunal stated that a seven-month period of "residence in the United 
States for a child [of] pre-school age is not sufficient to develop any substantial 
links to the American environment."25 In this way, the Tribunal suggested that 
children, particularly young children, face considerable difficulty in distin-
guishiug their dominant and effective nationality from that of their dual-national 
parent.26 
Indeed, the Tribunal made express this assumption in Ardavan Peter Samrad 
and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,27 where it also determined 
that the Claimant mother was a dominant and effective Iranian national." Al-
though the Tribunal noted that a parent's dominant and effective Iranian nation-
ality is not dispositive of the nationality ofthat parent's child, it cautioned that it 
does "place a heavy burden upon [the child] to show that her integration in 
American society was more rapid and more complete than that of her mother."" 
The Tribunal determined that this burden was greatest for the youngest Claim-
ant, who was less than eight years old when her claim arose.30 However, none of 
the Samrad siblings was able to meet the burden.'! 
The prospects for both the Samrad children and other minor dual nationals 
have also suffered from the failure of those claimants to submit evidence ade-
quate for the Tribunal to conclude that they are in fact dominant and effective 
United States nationals. In Samrad, the Tribunal noted that, with some small ex-
ceptions, one of the children had "provided no details of her life in the United 
States,"" and it held that both children had failed to present sufficient evidence 
to prove that their United States nationality had become dominant by the time 
their claims arose." Both the Samrad children and the Perry-Rohani children 
23. Id., paras. 17-18, reprinted in 22 Iran-US CTR 198-199. 
24. Id., para. 18, reprinted in 22 Iran-US CTR 199. 
25. !d., 
26. But see Dissenting Opinion of Richard C. Allison, Award No. 427-831-3, 30 June 1989, reprinted in 
22 Iran-US CTR 200 (criticizing the Tribunal for holding that Mrs. Perry-Rohani was a dominant 
and effective Iranian national and for compounding the error "by visiting it upon her children as 
well"). 
27. Samrad, supra note 18. 
28. Id., para. 30, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 54. 
29. Id., para. 38, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 56. 
30. Id., para. 41, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 57. 
31. Id., para. 44, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 58; see also Arakel Khajetoorians and The Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 504-350-2, 25 January 1991, paras. 19,21, reprinted in 
26 Iran-US CTR 37, 42-43 (holding that a minor child and her elder brother were dominant and ef-
fective Iranian nationals after same conclusion was reached about their dual-national father). 
32. Samrad, supra note 18, para. 39, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 56. 
33. Id., paras. 40, 43, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 57. The Tribunal also considered the claims of two 
adult Samrad siblings and found their failure to produce evidence to be even more severe. For ex-
ample, the Tribunal noted that Ardavan Peter Samrad submitted only his birth certificate and a two-
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were arguably disadvantaged by the relatively short time between their arrival in 
the United States and the date their claims arose,34 but even a lengthy period of 
United States residence is not sufficient to satisfY the Tribunal that a claimant 
has acquired dominant and effective United States nationality if the claimant 
fails to provide corroborating evidence. For instance, the minor claimant in 
Arakel Khajetoorians and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran" 
moved to the United States with her family when she was six years old and lived 
there for the following eight years until her claims arose,36 yet the Tribunal 
nonetheless found that she and her elder brother had failed to prove that they 
were dominant and effective United States nationals.37 Pointing to "the paucity 
of evidence" the Claimants submitted, the Tribunal noted that their documentary 
evidence consisted solely of their certificates of naturalization and certain in-
complete United States school records.38 The minor Claimant failed to provide 
"any evidence of what she studied in boarding school or where she spent school 
vacations," and neither she nor her elder brother provided "evidence of what 
language they customarily spoke with friends and family, what activities they 
participated in during their free time, or how much time they spent in Iran."39 
In light of the inherent difficulties in determining a child's allegiance and 
attachment to a particular nation as well as the failure of some claimants to sub-
mit adequate evidence, it should come as no surprise that minor dual nationals 
have fared considerably less well than their adult counterparts in their efforts to 
convince the Tribunal of their dominant and effective United States nationality. 
Before Sabet, the Tribunal determined approximately 32% of dual-national mi-
nors to be dominant and effective United States nationals, compared with ap-
proximately 65% of dual-national adults.40 The Sabet children, however, ap-
peared to have learned from their predecessors' mistakes, and by their produc-
page affidavit, which the Tribunal termed "little more than a curriculum vitae," ld., para. 31, re-
printed in 26 Iran-US eTR 54. But see Separate Opinion of George H. Aldrich, Award No. 505· 
46114621463/464/465-2, reprinted in 26 Iran-US eTR 59 (dissenting with respect to Tribunal's de-
termination that the two elder Samrad siblings were dominant and effective Iranian nationals). 
34. The Perry-Rohanis moved to the United States seven months before their claims arose. Perry-
Rohani, supra note 21, para. 1&, reprinted in 22 Iran-US eTR 199. The (not entirely clear) evidence 
suggested that the Samrad children moved to the United States approximately two years before their 
claims arose but that their mother probably moved to the United States only nine months before their 
claims arose. Samrad, supra note 18, paras. 17,20,29,39,42, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 49,50, 
53,56-57. 
35. Award No. 504-350-2, 25 January 1991, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 37. 
36. Id., para. 10, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR40. 
37. Id., para. 21, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 43. 
38. Id., para. 20, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR 42. 
39. Id., para. 21, reprinted in 26 Iran-US CTR43. 
40. Before Sabet, the Tribunal held seven out of twenty-two dual national minors to be dominant and ef-
fective United States nationals, while it held thirty-seven of fifty-seven dual national adults to be 
dominant and effective United States nationals. N.A. Combs, Analysis of Dual Nationality Claims in 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (on file with author) (excluding two cases in which claim-
ants filed no evidence whatsoever and in essence abandoned their claims). 
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tion of relevant evidence, they gave the Tribunal a solid basis for detennining 
their dominant and effective United States nationality and ample reason to dis-
tinguish it from those of their non-American parents. Indeed, Sabel is the first 
case in which the Tribunal determined minor claimants to be dominant and ef-
fective United States nationals even though neither of the Claimants' parents 
were United States nationals, let alone dominant and effective United States na-
tionals.'! 
The Sabet children submitted a plethora of evidence, detailing the most min-
ute aspects of their lives," and in doing so, they were able to paint a picture of 
children who were well integrated into American society by the time their 
claims arose. The following facts emerge. Both of Habib Sabet's sons, Iradj and 
Honnoz, were educated in the United States and both returned to Iran immedi-
ately after graduating from university in order to become involved in the Sabet 
family businesses.43 In 1963, Honnoz Sabet married Iran Khosrowshahi, an Ira-
nian-United States dual national, and Reja was born to them in the United States 
in December 1964. The family lived in Iran after Reja's birth, and when Honnoz 
and his wife divorced in 1967, Reja continued to live in Iran with his father. In 
1971, Honnoz married a British national, Valerie Osborne, who gave birth to 
Aram in the United States in August 1972. The family of four continued to live 
in Iran, although they vacationed and otherwise spent considerable time in 
Europe and the United States." In 1973, Honnoz and Valerie purchased an 
apartment in New York City and began renovating it. The family moved into the 
apartment in late 1975, when Reja was eleven and Aram was three.45 Karim was 
born in New York a few months later in March 1976.46 After moving into the 
New York apartment, Valerie and the boys lived pennanently in the United 
States, while Hormoz divided his time between the United States and lran.47 
Thus, before their claims arose, Reja spent his first eleven years living in Iran 
and the following three-and-a-half years living in the United States;" Aram 
spent his first three years living in Iran and the following three-and-one-half 
41. As I will describe below, neither Aram's nor Karim's parents were United States nationals. Reja's 
biological mother, who did not live with Reja after he was three years old, was a dual United States-
Iranian national whose dominant and effective nationality has not been detennined. 
42. They submitted their medical bills from American pediatricians, their school bills, their school re-
port cards, documentation concerning their extracurricular activities, as well as numerous affidavits 
from family members, friends of the family, friends of the children, and the children's teachers at-
testing to their integration into American society. 
43. Sabel, supra note I, para. 7. 
44. Id., para. 8. 
45. Id., para. 9. 
46. Id., para. 8. 
47. Jd., para. 9. 
48. Id.. paras. 22-24. 
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years living in the United States;49 and Karim spent the entire three years after 
his birth living in the United States. 50 
Valerie and Hormoz contended that they moved to New York because they 
wanted to raise their children as Americans. and because they were of the Baha'i 
faith and wanted to escape from the discrimination against Baha'is that they 
claimed was pervasive in Iran.51 Each of the children claimed to consider him-
self American and to be fu1\y integrated into American society during the rele-
vant period. English was their native language; although Reja and Aram ac-
knowledged that they could speak some Persian, they denied being able to read 
or write it, and Karim claimed not to be able even to speak it." The children also 
claimed to have no social or cultural attachments to Iran.53 Of the three children, 
Reja - who was the eldest and fourteen years old at the time his claim arose -
was best able to prove his social and cultural attachments to the United States. 
He submitted affidavits from several family friends and from friends of his own 
attesting to his activities and his integration into American society.54 
In light of the above evidence, the Tribunal appeared to have little difficulty 
finding the Sabet children to be dominant and effective United States nationals 
despite the fact that Hormoz was an Iranian national and Valerie (Aram and 
Karim's biological mother and Reja's stepmother and caretaker) was a British 
national. Although the Tribunal acknowledged that Hormoz's and Valerie's na-
tionalities were relevant in determining the children's dominant and effective 
nationality, it concluded that the arrangements that Hormoz and Valerie made 
for their children and the intentions they expressed were more relevant. 55 Thus, 
in contrast to earlier cases, in Sabet the Tribunal had no trouble distinguishing 
the children's nationality from those of their parents. According to the Tribunal, 
the evidence showed that, well before the children's claims arose, Hormoz and 
Valerie - despite their own non-American nationalities - made for their children 
a permanent home in the United States and manifested their intent to center their 
children's lives in the United States.56 And they succeeded. The Tribunal found 
that the three-and-one-half years that Reja and Aram spent living in the United 
States and attending school before their claims arose "afforded them ample time 
to integrate into American culture given their fluency in English and their previ-
ous exposure to United States influences."" As for Karim, because he lived his 
49. [d., para. 27. 
50. Id., para. 28. 
51. Id., para. 10 
52. ld., para. 12. 
53. Jd., paras. 25, 27-28. 
54. Jd., paras. 25, 35. 
55. Id., paras. 33-34. 
56. ld., para. 34. 
57. ld., para. 35. 
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entire life in the United States, the Tribunal found that he was exposed primarily 
to United States influences.58 
Having concluded that the Sabet children were dominant and effective 
United States nationals, and having satisfied itself that there were no other juris-
dictional impediments," the Tribunal went on to consider the merits of the 
claims. 
3. OWNERSHIP OF SHARES IN TIlE SABET FAMILY COMPANIES 
The Sabet children claimed to own shares in twenty-one Iranian companies,60 six 
of which used registered shares, while the other fifteen used bearer shares.6l The 
children had no difficulty proving their ownership of the registered shares," hut 
unfortunately for them, they owned very small percentages of the registered-
share companies.6J They claimed, by contrast, to have far greater holdings in the 
bearer-share companies. Indeed, they claimed collectively to own approximately 
25% of all the Sabet family shares in the bearer-share companies. Their prob-
lem, however, was that in contemporaneous company records, the shares were 
listed as owned by other Sabet family members.64 The Sabet children explained 
this by contending that when their grandfather Habib retired, he intended for his 
two sons to share one half of his bearer shares and his six grandchildren (Iradj's 
three children and Hormoz's three children) to share the other half." So, Habib 
entrusted possession of the shares primarily to Iradj and Hormoz, but it was un-
derstood that they each held one half of the shares that were listed in their names 
for their children.66 
58. Id" para. 36. 
59. See id., paras. 52-54. 
60. Eleven of the companies were affiliated soft-drink bottling companies. 
61. In Iran, shares in private joint stock companies could be in registered or unregistered fann. Com-
mercial Code of Iran, Art. 23. The holder of un-registered, or "bearer," shares was considered their 
owner unless the contrary was proved. Id., Art. 24. 
62. Sabet, supra note 1, para. 60. Indeed, Iran acknowledged that the children were the record owners of 
the shares but contended that their father, Honnoz, was the beneficial owner. Id., para. 58. The Tri-
bunal rejected that argument./d., para. 59. 
63. The children collectively owned 1.6% of Mina Glass Company, 2.1 % of Nownahallan Company, 
2.9% of General Tire and Rubber Company, 2.9% ofTowlid Rowghan Refining Company, 4.6% of 
Iran Cylinder Company, and 8.3% ofZamzam Tehran. Jd., para. 60. 
64. ld., para. 65. 
65. Id .. paras. 62-65. 
66. ld., paras. 62-65. The children also claimed to own one half of the bearer shares that were listed in 
their grandmother Bahereh's name, while they maintained that Iradj's three children also owned one 
half of the shares listed in the name of Iradj's wife, Faegheh RamsLld., para. 65. At the Hearing, the 
Sabets argued in a somewhat different vein, but to the same result, that the Sabet family members 
treated their shareholdings as a single, undivided parcel owned in common by each of the family 
members, and it was understood that the children owned their proportionate share of bearer shares. 
[d., para. 66. 
182 On Children and Dual Nationality 13 LJIL (2000) 
The Tribunal noted that the children were, in essence, claiming to be the 
beneficial owners of the shares.67 The Tribunal has traditionally "favored benefi-
cial over nominal ownership of property,"68 recognizing, in appropriate circum-
stances, that "beneficial ownership is both a method of exercising control over 
property and a compensable property interest in its own right."69 At the same 
time, the Tribunal has required a party alleging beneficial ownership "to produce 
strong evidence" that he, and not the nominal owner, was in reality the true 
owner of the property.70 Consequently, the Tribunal has, over the years, consid-
ered several rather close claims of beneficial ownership.71 
Sabet, however, did not seem to be among them. The Sabet children submit-
ted an abundance of evidence designed to prove their beneficial ownership of 
the claimed bearer shares.72 Even a brief summary of all of the evidence and ar-
guments would be too lengthy for present purposes; suffice it to say that the Tri-
bunal thoroughly examined each piece of evidence but found that none of the 
evidence, either individually or collectively, satisfied the children's burden of 
proving that they were the beneficial owners of any of the bearer shares.73 Al-
though it is by no means implausible to think that the Sabet family considered 
the Claimants (and the other grandchildren) as sharing in the Sabet family 
wealth, that very general belief cannot form the basis for a legal determination 
that the children owned a specific number of shares for which Iran must com-
pensate them. 
4. EXPROPRIATION 
Having concluded that the Sabet children owned registered shares in six compa-
nies, the Tribunal next had to determine whether Iran expropriated those shares. 
However, the Tribunal's treatment of the expropriation question justifies only a 
brief mention for the simple reason that the Tribunal had before it such clear, 
uncontroverted documentary evidence that Iran did formally expropriate all of 
the Sabet family assets that even Iran did not "seriously dispute that the assets of 
the Sabet family were confiscated."74 The Tribunal thus concluded that Iran was 
67. Id., para. 69. 
68. James M. Saghi and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 544-298-2,22 January 1993, para. 18 
[hereinafter Saghi]. 
69. Id., para. 26. 
70. Reza Nemazee and The Government of the Islamic Republic ofIran, Award No. 575-4-3, 10 De-
cember 1996, para. 54. 
71. See, e.g., id., paras. 54-63; Saghi, supra note 68, paras. 27-44. 
72. See Sabel, supra note 1, paras. 61-92. 
73. Jd., paras. 70, 93. 
74. Id., para. 103; see also id., para. 101 (describing Iran as "apparently not denying that an expropria-
tion occurred"). 
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liable to compensate the children for the loss of their ownership interests in the 
six registered-share companies.75 
5. THE CAVEAT 
5.1. The Tribuual's pre-Sabel jurisprudeuce 
As noted above. the Tribunal determined in Case No. A 18 that it had jurisdiction 
over the claims of dual Iranian-United States nationals against Iran so long as 
the claimant's dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States.76 
In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal at the same time recognized the risk 
that certain dual-national claimants might attempt "to have their cake and eat it 
too." That is, they might bring their claims before the Tribunal on the basis of 
their United States nationality while, at the same time, seeking compensation for 
property that they had been able to acquire only on the basis of their Iranian na-
tionality. Consequently, in Case No. AI8 and in a series of cases decided by 
specific Tribunal chambers, the Tribunal developed an equitable principle 
known as "the caveat,,,77 to prevent what the Tribunal considered to be an abuse 
ofnationality.78 
The caveat operates at the intersection between Iranian nationality law and 
Iranian property law, so some background on each is necessary. Iranian law im-
poses Iranian nationality on a wide range of individuals, including, among many 
others, women of foreign nationality who marry Iranian men and persons born 
to Iranian fathers, no matter where they are born." Once Iranian nationality is 
imposed, it is difficult to renounce.80 Indeed, Iranian law does not permit certain 
Iranian nationals to renounce their Iranian nationality under any circumstances. 
For instance, children, like the Sabet Claimants, who are under 25 years of age 
and have Iranian fathers cannot renounce their Iranian nationality,"l nor, appar-
75. Jd., para. 106. 
76. Case No. A18, supra note 12, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR265. 
77. The 'caveat' got its name from the "important caveat" that the Full Tribunal added to its decision in 
Case No. A18, namely: "In cases where the Tribunal finds jurisdiction based upon a dominant and 
effective nationality of the claimant. the other nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the 
claim." Jd., at 265-66. 
78. For a more comprehensive treatment of the caveat's development, see N.A. Combs, Toward a New 
Understanding oJ Abuse a/Nationality in Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 10 
Am. Rev. Int'! Arb. 27 (I 999) (forthcoming). 
79. The Civil Code ofiran. Art. 976(2) and (6) (MAR Taleghany trans .• 1995). 
80. At a minimum, an Iranian national seeking to renounce his Iranian nationality must meet several 
strict requirements, including, among other things, obtaining permission from the Council of Minis-
ters and undertaking "in advance" to transfer all his immovable property in Iran to Iranian nationals 
within one year from his renunciation. Id., Art. 988(2) and (3). 
81. Id., Art. 988(1). A child WIder the age of 25 with an Iranian father might be able to renounce his Ira-
nian nationality at the same time that his father renOWIces his own Iranian nationality, but only if the 
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ently, can women who are married to Iranian men." Further, Iranian law does 
not recognize dual nationality;83 it considers a dual national's foreign nationality 
to be "null and void" and therefore recognizes only the dual national's Iranian 
nationality." Thus, dual nationals, like the Sabet children, who seek to acquire 
property in Iran must do so in their capacity as Iranian nationals. This fact be-
comes relevant because Iran restricts the ownership of certain property to Ira-
nian nationals. For example, certain kinds of real property in Iran can under no 
circumstances be owned by foreign nationals. 85 Further, in certain companies 
and enterprises, foreigners can own only a limited percentage of shares, while 
the remaining shares must be owned by Iranian nationals.86 It is claims for these 
types of properties that have typically implicated the Tribunal's "caveat." 
The Tribunal gave its first thorough examination of the caveat in James M 
Saghi and Islamic Republic of Iran, 87 in which Chamber Two of the Tribunal 
established the test to determine when the caveat should apply: 
The caveat is evidently intended to apply to claims by dual nationals for benefits lim-
ited by relevant and applicable Iranian law to persons who were nationals solely of 
Iran. However, [ ... ] the equitable principle expressed by this rule can, in principle, 
Council of Ministers' permission for the father's renunciation includes the child as well. Id, Art. 
988(3). 
82. Article 986 of the Iranian Civil Code permits a "non-Iranian wife who becomes Iranian by mar-
riage" to revert to her former nationality after the divorce or death of her husband provided that she 
notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in writing. However, a widow who has children from her 
late husband cannot revert to her former nationality while the children are under eighteen years of 
age. Id., The provision gives no hint that a woman currently married to an Iranian man can renounce 
her Iranian nationality under any circumstances. Further, Article 988 of the Iranian Civil Code be-
gins by stating that "Iranian nationals may not abandon their nationality except on the following 
conditions." Although paragraph (3) indicates that a woman married to an Iranian man might be able 
to renounce her Iranian nationality at the same time that her husband renounces his, if the Council of 
Ministers' permission for the husband includes the wife, none of the "conditions" referred to above 
suggests that a woman married to an Iranian man can individually renounce her Iranian nationality. 
83. See Leila Danesh Arfa Mahmoud and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 204-237-2, 27 No-
vember 1985, para. 20, reprinted in 9 Iran-US CTR 350, 354. 
84. The Civil Code of Iran, supra note 79, Art. 989. That article provides in part: "Any Iranian national 
who has acquired foreign nationality after the solar year 1280 A.H. (1901-2) without observing the 
legal requirements, shall have his or her foreign nationality declared null and void and shall be re-
garded as an Iranian subject." See also Zaman Azar Nourafchan and The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 550-412/415-3, 19 October 1993, para. 30. (Iran "invok[ed] provisions of the Iranian 
Civil Code [to prove] that it does not recognize the foreign nationality of its nationals, whether ac-
quired by naturalization or by birth on foreign soil."). 
85. See Rouhollah Karubian and The Government of the Islamic Republic ofIran, Award No. 569-419-
2, 6 March 1996, paras. 157-59 [hereinafter Karubian]; Moussa Aryeh and The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Award No. 583-266-3, 25 September 1997, para. 76 [hereinafter Aryeh]. 
86. See, e.g., Robert R. Schott and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 474-268-1, 14 March 1990, 
para. 19, reprinted in 24 Iran-US CTR 203 ("Iranians' Bank was limited to a maximum of35 per-
cent foreign ownership"); Faith Lita Khosrowshahi and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 558-
178-2, 30 June 1994, para 70 [hereinafter Khosrowshahi] (bank's shares divided into categories A 
and B, with B shares reserved to foreigners and restricted to no more than 25% of total stock). 
87. Saghi, supra note 68. 
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have a broader application. Even when a dual national's claim relates to benefits not 
limited by law to Iranian nationals, the Tribunal may still apply the caveat when the 
evidence compels the conclusion that the dual national has abused his dual nationality 
in such a way that he should not be allowed to recover on his claim.88 
With this phrasing, the Tribunal established a two-pronged test: the caveat will 
apply to a claim if the dual-national claimant either (1) seeks compensation for a 
benefit restricted by Iranian law to sole Iranian nationals, or (2) has otherwise 
abused his nationality in such a way as to justify barring his claim. 
The second prong of the Saghi test - the "other abuse of nationality" prong -
appears somewhat indeterminate, but in Saghi itself the Tribunal provided its 
first and, so far its last, example of its application. One of the Saghi Claimants, 
Allan Saghi, had been born with Iranian nationality but had successfully re-
nounced it. 89 Soon after he did so, Iran enacted the Law for the Expansion of 
Public Ownership of Productive Units ("Law for Expansion"), which the Saghi 
family believed limited the percentage of shares in their company that could be 
held by foreigners,90 Apparently in order to retain maximum ownership of the 
family's shares, Allan Saghi applied for reversion to Iranian nationality, and his 
application was granted. The Saghi family then executed several share transfers 
and submitted to the Iranian authorities shareholders' lists designating Allan 
Saghi as an Iranian shareholder.9l 
The Tribunal held that Allan Saghi had "consciously sought and obtained 
Iranian nationality solely for the purpose of having certain shares [ ... J placed in 
his name in order to minimize the adverse effects of the Law for Expansion,"" 
and it consequently barred his claim for those shares pursuant to the second 
prong of the caveat test. The Tribunal concluded that it did not need to deter-
mine whether Allan Saghi's shares were in fact restricted by law to Iranian na-
tionals - pursuant to the first prong of the caveat test - because "fundamental 
considerations of equity" required that his claim be dismissed, even if the shares 
he held were not restricted to Iranian nationals." To rule otherwise, according to 
the Tribunal, "would be to permit an abuse of right."'4 
Judge Aldrich, Chamber Two's American arbitrator, issued a concurrence, 
emphasizing the "exceptional circumstances" of SagheS and highlighting some 
of the factors that the Tribunal would later consider in Sabel. Judge Aldrich dis-
tinguished between "Allan Saghi's situation" - which he deemed to be "proba-
88. Id., para. 54. 
89. James M. Saghi and The Government of the Islamic Republic ofITan, Award No. ITL 66-298-2, 
2 January 1987, para. 6, reprinted in 14 Iran-US CTR 3, 5. 
90. Saghi, supra note 68, paras. 6, 55. 
91. Id .. para. 59. 
92. Jd. 
93. Jd. 
94. Jd. 
95. Jd. 
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bly unique among claims presented to the Tribunal" - and that of "most, if not 
all," dual-national claimants, who instead had Iranian nationality imposed upon 
them either by birth to an Iranian father or by marriage to an Iranian man." 
Judge Aldrich went on to note that, "[w]hile abandonment ofIranian nationality 
is not, in theory, impossible under Iranian law for persons who are more than 24 
years old," it involves numerous restrictions such that it "evidently rarely occurs 
in practice. "97 
The Tribunal considered the first prong of the Saghi test in a series of subse-
quent cases, the most important of which involved real property." These cases 
make clear, as Saghi's articulation of the first prong would suggest, that the ca-
veat will apply to a claim that is for benefits reserved by law to Iranian nation-
als. These cases also make clear that it is the first prong of the Saghi test that 
plays the primary role in the Tribunal's caveat jurisprudence. Although Iran has 
pointed to a variety of behavior that it claimed constituted other abuse of nation-
ality that would justify barring a claim, the Tribunal has not since Saghi found 
the second prong of the Saghi test applicable.99 
5.2. The Tribunal'S application ofthe caveat in Sabel 
In Sabet, the Tribunal had before it a relatively straightforward caveat claim, but 
it broke new ground by holding for the first time that a claimant's inability to 
renounce Iranian nationality militated against application of the caveat. I suggest 
below that the Tribunal extend its consideration of that factor to make it a more 
central feature of its caveat jurisprudence. 
Iran argued that two laws - The Law Concerning the Attraction and Protec-
tion of Foreign Investments ("LAPFI") and the Law for Expansion - placed re-
strictions on the percentage of shares in the Sabet companies that could be 
owned by foreigners such that the Sabet children owned shares that were re-
stricted by law to Iranian nationals.1Oo Iran also accused the Sabets of abusing 
their nationality by failing to disclose to Iranian authorities that their shares were 
held by United States nationals and by failing to pay certain taxes imposed on 
foreigners and on Iranians residing abroad.101 
96. Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, Award No. 544-298-2, 22 January 1993, para. 2. 
97. [d., para. 2, n.l. 
98. See, e.g., Karubian, supra note 85, paras. 146-62; Aryeh, supra note 85, paras. 51-86; Jahangir Mo-
htadi and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 573-271-3, 2 December 
1996, paras. 34, 88-92; George E. Davidson (Homayounjah) and The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award No. 585-457-1, 5 March 1998, paras. 74-77 [hereinafter Davidson]. 
99. For instance, Iran has unsuccessfully argued that using an Iranian identity card in acquiring property 
and paying a more favorable tax rate as a result of owning the property as an Iranian should trigger 
application of the caveat. See AtaolJah Golpira and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 32-211-2, 
29 March 1983, reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 171, 174; Khosrowshahi, supra note 86, paras. 31-33. 
100. Sabel, supra note 1, para. Ill. 
101. Id., para. 112. 
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Pursuant to Saghi's first prong, the Tribunal detennined that neither LAPFl 
nor the Law for Expansion restricted the foreign ownership of the Sabets' 
shares. The Tribunal rejected Iran's contentions with respect to LAPFI, citing 
Kimberly-Clark,102 in which the Tribunal held that LAPFI granted special pro-
tection for foreign investments but that none of its provisions prevented foreign 
investors from owning shares outside the LAPFI regime, as the Sabets had. 103 
Turning to the Law for Expansion, the Tribunal noted that the law itself made no 
mention of any restrictions on foreign shareholdings but that regulations prom-
ulgated subsequently provided that a Council for Expansion of Ownership of 
Producing Units would detennine the maximum percentage of shares that could 
be held by foreigners for each company falling within the scope of the Law for 
Expansion. 104 The Tribunal concluded, however, that Iran had "submitted not a 
single piece of evidence" indicating that the Council ever got around to limiting 
the foreign shareholdings of the companies in which the Sabets owned shares; 
thus, the Tribunal concluded that Iran had not proved that the Law for Expan-
sion restricted the ownership of shares in the companies to Iranian nationals.1°S 
Turning to the second prong of the Saghi test, the Tribunal detennined that 
the equitable considerations that gave rise to the application of the caveat in 
Saghi were not present.106 In particular, the Tribunal focused on the constraints 
imposed by Iranian nationality law and distinguished the facts of Sabet from 
those of Saghi by noting that unlike Allan Saghi, the Sabet children 
did not actively seek Iranian nationality to minimize the adverse effects of the Law for 
Expansion. Quite the contrary, the Claimants' Iranian nationality was conferred on 
them by reason of their father's nationality, and under Article 988 of the Civil Code of 
Iran, under ordinary circumstances, they had no ability to renounce that nationality 
until they reached 25 years of age. And because only their Iranian nationality would 
be recognized in Iran, the Claimants had no choice but to hold their shares as Iranians. 
This fact also militates against the application of the Al8 caveat in the present 
Cases. 107 
In my view, the Tribunal advanced its caveat jurisprudence considerably by rec-
ognizing, in the context of Saghi's second prong, the relevance of a claimant's 
inability to renounce Iranian nationality. However, the Tribunal should go fur-
ther: It should consider this factor in the context of Saghi's first prong. For one 
thing, if the Tribunal confines consideration of a claimant's ability to renounce 
Iranian nationality to its analysis of Saghi's second prong, then it will render the 
102. Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 46-57-2, 25 May 1983, reprinted in 
2 Iran·US CTR 334. 339. 
103. Sabel, supra note 1, para. 124. 
104. Id., para. 120. 
105. Id., para. 125. 
106. Id., para. 127. 
107. !d .. para. 128. 
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factor largely irrelevant, for Saghi's second prong seems to be confined to the 
unique facts of that case. As noted above, the "exceptional circumstances" of 
Saghi are not apt to recur,'OS and the Tribunal has identified no other circum-
stances that might constitute an abuse of right under Saghi 's second prong. Fur-
ther, a claimant's inability to renounce Iranian nationality would have little rele-
vance to a case like Saghi, even if it were to recur, because a claimant like Allan 
Saghi who purposefully acquired Iranian nationality in order to secure benefits 
can hardly complain that Iranian law prohibited him from subsequently re-
nouncing that nationality. More importantly, the Tribunal should consider a 
claimant's inability to renounce Iranian nationality in its analysis of Saghi's first 
prong simply because it is highly relevant to that inquiry. 
As noted above, neither a person under 25 years of age born to an Iranian 
father nor a woman married to an Iranian man can renounce Iranian national-
ity.'09 Further, because Iran refuses to recognize a dual national's foreign nation-
ality, these two categories of persons have no choice but to be treated as Iranian 
nationals by Iran for all purposes, including for property ownership. Thus, when 
acquiring property, persons in these categories have no choice but to acquire the 
kind of property that can or that must be held by Iranians. At the same time, the 
Tribunal has held, under the first prong of the Saghi test, that acquiring property 
reserved by law to Iranian nationals and then claiming compensation for that 
property as a dominant and effective United States national is an abuse of right. 
While that conclusion may be justifiable when applied to claimants who could 
have renounced nationality and consequently chosen the type of property they 
acquired, further analysis is necessary when the claimants are among those who 
had no such choice. 
One must note at the outset, however, that a claimant's inability to renounce 
Iranian nationality will not be relevant to the first prong of the Saghi test in 
every case. Rather, whether it is relevant will depend on the kind of property for 
which the claimant is claiming. A claimant's inability to renounce Iranian na-
tionality would appear to have no relevance when the claim is for a type of 
property that could not under any circumstances have been owned by foreigners; 
for example, certain kinds of real property in IranYo This is because the claim-
ant could not have owned such "wholly restricted" property even if he had been 
capable of renouncing his Iranian nationality; thus, his incapacity to renounce 
Iranian nationality would have no bearing on the Tribunal's consideration of the 
caveat. 
108. See Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, supra note 96, para. 2; Bedennan, supra note 15, at 
86. 
109. The two groups are distinguishable, of course, because women can choose the men they marry while 
children cannot choose their parents. However, a woman's choice as to whom to marry is so funda~ 
mental and so unlikely to be deterred by the imposition of an unwanted nationality, that both women 
married to Iranian men and children born to Iranian fathers can be considered similarly situated. 
110. See Karubian, supra note 85, paras. 157·59; Aryeh, supra note 85, para. 76. 
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The same cannot be said, however, for property such as that which Iran al-
leged to be at issue in Sabel - that is, shares of stock of which foreigners could 
own only a certain percentage, with the remainder to be held by Iranians. With 
respect to this "partially restricted" property, the distinction between those who 
could renounce their Iranian nationality and those who could not is significant. 
Whereas an adult male dual national could choose either to purchase the shares 
of the company that were reserved to Iranians or to renounce his Iranian nation-
ality and purchase the shares of the company reserved to foreigners, a person 
under the age of 25 with an Iranian father or a woman married to an Iranian man 
had no such choice. These dual nationals were forced to remain Iranians, and, 
when purchasing shares of stock, they were forced to purchase those shares re-
served to Iranians. 
Of course, one might argue that a claimant's inability to renounce Iranian 
nationality is irrelevant even with respect to partially restricted property because 
either the ceiling for foreign shareholders has been reached or it has not been; 
that is, either all of the shares reserved to foreigners have been acquired by other 
foreign shareholders or some are still available. If some are still available, then 
the caveat will not in any event bar the claim because the Tribunal will not con-
sider the claimant to have acquired property reserved by law to Iranian nation-
als. 1lI Conversely, if the ceiling for foreign shareholders has been reached, one 
could argue that the remaining shares - that is, the shares reserved to Iranians 
for which the claimant is claiming - are analogous to property that can under no 
circumstances be owned by foreigners so that the claimant's inability to re-
nounce Iranian nationality would be irrelevant to the Tribunal's analysis. 
However, to reason thus would be to presume an answer to a question the 
Tribunal has never asked: Why did the claimant acquire the benefit reserved by 
law to Iranian nationals in the first place? When the claimant is one who could 
have renounced his Iranian nationality, the Tribunal can appropriately conclude 
that he voluntarily chose to retain it and to acquire the benefits made available 
thereby. His claim as a dominant and effective United States national is likely to 
be considered an abuse of right. However, when the claimant is one who could 
not have renounced his Iranian nationality, then the fact that he acquired prop-
erty reserved by law to Iranian nationals does not indicate anything about the 
reason that he did so. It certainly is possible that he acquired property reserved 
to Iranian nationals because Iranian law allowed him to obtain only that category 
of property; that is, that he would have renounced his Iranian nationality had he 
been able to and would have negotiated with the company's existing foreign 
shareholders to purchase some of their shares. 
111. Khosrowshahi, supra note 86, para. 73 (Claimants, who were dual national minors, acquired Cate-
gory A stock reserved to Iranian nationals but caveat was held not applicable because Category B 
shares were still available). 
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The question thus becomes one of the burden of proof. Iran has the burden of 
proving that the caveat should apply to a claim;!!2 consequently, Iran should be 
required to prove not only that the claim is for property reserved by law to Ira-
nian nationals but, in cases in which the claimant could not renounce his Iranian 
nationality, that the claimant would have acquired that category of property even 
if he had been able to renounce his Iranian nationality and acquire property 
available to foreign nationals. Absent such a showing, the claim cannot be con-
sidered an abuse of right. Iran should not be permitted to benefit from requiring 
claimants to act in a way that it later can deem to be abusive. As the Tribunal 
has held: "The caveat is essentially an equitable instrument, intended to remedy 
any bad faith use of nationality [ ... ]"113 A claimant who has no choice as to how 
he uses his nationality cannot be said to have used it in bad faith. 
In attempting to make this showing, Iran might point to the fact that, as 
Judge Aldrich has noted, renunciation of Iranian nationality is apparently rare in 
practice because it results in a variety of restrictions, including, among other 
things, restrictions upon visits to Iran.!!4 That is, Iran might point to the fact that 
very few people have ever renounced their Iranian nationality to prove that a 
particular claimant would not have done so either. However, that argument 
might be a two-edged sword. If the restrictions that Iran imposes on those seek-
ing to renounce Iranian nationality are so onerous that they deter virtually eve-
ryone, then one might question whether Iran has provided any of its nationals 
with a viable means of renouncing Iranian nationality. 
To summarize, in Sabet the Tribunal took a step in the right direction by con-
sidering the Sabet children's inability to renounce Iranian nationality in the 
context of Saghi's second prong. However, the Tribunal should take a further 
step and incorporate a claimant's inability to renounce Iranian nationality into its 
analysis of Saghi's more important first prong. The inability to renounce Iranian 
112. The Tribunal has never expressly placed this burden on Iran, but it has impliedly done so. See Aryeh, 
supra note 85, para 75 (concluding that Iran was "unable to point to a comprehensive provision in 
Iranian law that contains an express prohibition on the ownership of real estate by foreign or dual 
nationals"); Sabel, supra note 1, para. 125 (Iran "submitted not a single piece of evidence that indi-
cates that the Council [ ... ] made a determination to limit the [company's] foreign sharehoJdings [ ... r). This conclusion is further supported by Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Tribunal Rules, which 
provides that "[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his claim 
or defence." Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 3 May 1983, (emphasis added) reprinted in 2 Iran-
US CTR405, 427; see also Vera~Jo Miller Aryeh and The Islamic Republic ofIran, Award No. 581-
842/843/844~1, para. 157 (22 May 1997) (describing the "basic rule of burden of proof' in interna-
tional tribunals as resting "upon him who asserts the affirmation of a proposition that if not substan-
tiated will result in a decision adverse to his contention") (quoting D. V. Sandifer, Evidence Before 
International Tribunals 127 (1975». 
113. Aryeh, supra note 85, para. 84; see also Davidson, supra note 98, para. 76 (describing the caveat as 
"an instrument of equity intended to prevent abuses of right"). 
114. Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, supra note 96, at para. 2, n.1. See also Davidson, supra 
note 98, para. 31 (finding the caveat not applicable and describing the Claimant's contention that 
Council of Ministers rarely consents to renunciation of Iranian nationality). 
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nationality will not be relevant when the claim is for wholly restricted property; 
because foreign nationals could not under any circumstances own that kind of 
property, it will be of no consequence that the claimant was prevented from re-
nouncing Iranian nationality to become a sole foreign national. However, with 
respect to partially restricted property, such as that which was alleged to be at is-
sue in Sabel, Iran should be required to prove not only that a claimant who could 
not renounce Iranian nationality acquired property restricted by Iranian law to 
sole Iranian nationals, but that the claimant would have acquired the same prop-
erty had he been able to renounce his Iranian nationality. If Iran cannot make 
that showing, the caveat should not apply. 
6. CONCLUSION 
By becoming the first case to find minor claimants to be dominant and effective 
United States nationals even though neither of their parents was a United States 
national, Sabel provides new insights into the dual nationality of minors. Still, it 
is Sabet's treatment of the caveat that proves its most interesting feature. The 
Tribunal broke new ground by considering a claimant's inability to renounce 
Iranian nationality in the context of Saghi's second prong. The Tribunal should 
make that factor a more central feature of its caveat jurisprudence by consider-
ing it when analyzing Saghi's first prong as well. 
